It would be of considerable interest to map the set, space, and world of FORMS' CAUSES onto, into, and via the set, space, and world of UNIVERSAL CAUSES. And at the same time to do the opposite: to map the set, space, and world of Universal Causes onto, into, and via the set, space, and world of Forms' Causes. Let no reader make the mistake of assuming that any of the many terms, and sets of terms, which I have just used - or that any of the innumerable kinds of relationships and subtasks I have just implied - were redundant. Each on the contrary is a distinct and important thing which merits attention on its own. Of course all this highlights the complexity of ideonomy and the impossibility of describing it here in a more than superficial way.
Among the many benefits that might be expected from systematically mapping the causes of forms onto the space of the causes of things in general, would be insight into both the general and specialized nature of the former, and a logical delimitation of the former as a subordinate region or function of causation in general. Clues might be provided as to what morphogenesis is and isn't. Also useful indications how thought about the etiology of shape might be generalized or modelled by more abstract terms and devices; much as centuries ago geometry was given an algebraic interpretation, and numerical algebra, in this century, was enlarged and transformed into symbolic algebra and a new world of mathematical techniques.
Moreover, referring universal causes to the narrow world of forms' causes could help to give more detailed, concrete, and rigorous meaning to the latter realm, and at the same time serve as a test of the true generality, and local adaptability, of the former.
Furthermore, beyond and yet bordering the subject of shapes proper are to be found closely related and yet distinct categories of things, which similarly can be expected to possess etiology kindred to that of form and yet likewise far short of being universal; and mapping or locating forms' causes within the space of universal causes ought to clarify the causes and geneses of these congeneric things - things such as structures, textures, manifolds, spectrums, patterns, and even motions.
Certainly if a purported list of all the causes of form, and a purported list of all causes in general, were to be systematically compared, omissions from and improvements to both might well be suggested.